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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) addresses consumer protection,
employer-provided insurance coverage, as well as the government’s role in providing health
care access to the most vulnerable populations. Within the practice of neurology, the
PPACA has the challenging goal of reconciling the needs of the growing elderly popula-
tion with the financial barriers to costly yet available health care services. To bridge that
gap, all health care professionals working in the field of neurology must reflect on the effect
previous Medicare reimbursement policies have had on the current practice of neurology,
and utilize lessons learned in recent years. The test of time will tell whether the PPACA
will achieve the goal of decreasing in health care spending while ensuring quality universal
healthcare services.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). It was an event of historic
significance for healthcare in the US. The PPACA addresses con-
sumer protection, employer-provided insurance coverage, and
the government’s role in providing health care access to the
most vulnerable populations including the elderly and physically
disabled.
For consumers, PPACA removes barriers to preventive care,
prevents insurance companies from rejecting patients due to pre-
existing conditions, and prohibits lifetime limits on insurance
coverage and cancelations due to serious diseases. For employ-
ers, PPACA authorizes tax credits of up to 35% of premiums to
make employe coverage more affordable, as well as a temporary
reinsurance program to offset the costs of expensive health claims
to employers who provide health benefits for retirees 55–64 years
of age (1). For the elderly population, who are most affected
by neurological diseases, PPACA expands Medicaid coverage to
all non-Medicare eligible individuals under 65 years of age with
incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level.
Within the practice of neurology, the PPACA has the challeng-
ing goal of reconciling the needs of the growing elderly population
with the financial barriers to costly yet available health care ser-
vices. To bridge that gap, all health care professionals working
in the field of neurology must reflect on the effect previous
Medicare reimbursement policies have had on the current practice
of neurology, and apply the lessons learned to the years to come.
DISCUSSION
Over the past years, health care services for neurological diseases
have shifted from being primarily inpatient (often necessitating
extended hospitalizations to deliver medical care) to nearly entirely
outpatient practices. Many neurological diseases ranging from pri-
mary headaches to advanced neurodegeneration require not only
hospital care, but also continuing skilled nursing care, home health
care, or custodial care provided by supporting family members
in response to the patient’s deteriorating functional abilities. It
has been estimated that the national cost of medical and long-
term care for Alzheimer’s patients was $200 billion in 2012, not
accounting for the estimated $17 billion of unpaid care provided
by family members and friends. Alzheimer’s patients live nearly
10 years after their diagnosis, and they usually need full-time care,
initially at home, and eventually in a skilled nursing facility.
The medical care costs associated with disabling neurological
diseases cripple patients’ families at a time when they are also cop-
ing with the far reaching practical, social, and emotional impact
of taking care of a family member who is ill. Thus, in addition to
providing the necessary medications for patients with neurolog-
ical diseases, it is essential that the health care system provide a
multidisciplinary range of services meeting the broad spectrum of
physical, medical, and psychological needs (2).
Medicare, especially Part B which covers outpatient reimburse-
ments, was enacted in 1965 to provide relief for such patients. It
was established as a fee-for-service program based on prevailing
fees within different geographic areas inside the US. This fee-for-
service model of physician reimbursements was implemented at a
time in American history when market conditions worked against
high physician and hospital reimbursements. After its enactment,
the physician payment rate under Medicare ironically increased
by an average of 18% annually between 1975 and 1987. This out-
come raised the question of whether physicians responded to fee
pressures by providing more services to compensate for lower
reimbursements per service. It also brought to the forefront an
ethical dilemma that patients with less serious conditions could
be preferentially selected, while those with complicated diseases
could be referred to more specialized physicians. This propagated
the development of physician-owned private specialty hospitals
and diagnostic centers that competed with community hospitals
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for their more profitable services resulting in the continuing loss
of community hospitals (2).
In 1983, the US Federal government radically changed the way
hospitals would be reimbursed by Medicare by formulating a new
payment system referred to as Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs)
to provide hospitals with incentives to deliver efficient medical care
and discharge patients as soon as possible. It was clear that the pre-
vious retrospective reimbursement system provided no incentives
for hospitals to keep their costs down or limit hospital lengths of
stay (LOS). DRGs were a prospective payment alternative which
used the patient’s diagnosis to determine in advance how much a
hospital would be reimbursed for a particular diagnosis (3).
In a study of 84 New Jersey hospitals to examine their short-
term response of DRG reimbursements versus primary payer sys-
tems, the pricing mechanism exerted a significant influence on the
cost per case, the cost per day, and number of cases treated. Specif-
ically, the study suggests that a savings of 14.1% per admission
and 9.8% per day were attributable to the DRG program and that
the pricing mechanism induced hospitals to increase the number
of admissions by 11.7%. The results further suggest that the DRG
pricing mechanism influenced hospitals to shortened the average
LOS by 6.5% (4).
Because DRGs as part of the Prospective Payment System (PPS)
established fixed payment amounts per hospital admission for
each DRG, hospitals theoretically could enhance their revenue and
margins by increasing the number of admissions for all DRGs for
which payment exceeded the marginal costs of care (5). Before
PPS, Medicare admissions had increased steadily, with the annual
increases never falling below 3% (6). All but 2 of 20 studies that
were used to measure the effect of PPS on hospital admissions
found PPS associated with a decrease in admissions (7). Among
the few studies with data after 1986, all show that admission levels
stabilized or begun to increase slightly by 1987.
The average LOS for Medicare beneficiaries was declining
slowly, and the introduction of DRG was expected to accelerate
that trend. The introduction of DRGs was associated with a brief
but large reduction in LOS. Newhouse and Byrne (8) found that
average LOS for all elderly patients covered by Medicare actually
rose slightly in 1984. Only in 1985 did LOS drop below the pre-
PPS level. The likely reason that overall LOS increased in 1984
is that the percentage of all elderly patients with extremely long
stays increased sufficiently to offset any decreases in LOS for other
patients.
The new reimbursement system caused major shifts in the way
healthcare services are delivered in the specialty of neurology. It
forced hospitals to provide the best care possible in the allowed
time, and also shifted many neurological services to the outpatient
setting to curb the high costs incurred in more expensive inpatient
setting. These changes also place important emphasis in provi-
sion of higher quality care in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and
other ambulatory care areas, with focus on improving access and
minimizing inpatient hospital readmissions.
Managed Care Organizations (MCO) were starting to leave an
impression in the healthcare market. MCOs reformed the tra-
ditional fee-for-service model, with contractual prepayments for
specified packages of comprehensive medical care for groups of
patients. Although MCOs have slowed down rising costs in the
80s and 90s, they were later criticized for withholding medically
necessary services, and responded to public pressures by offering
more comprehensive plans with increasing insurance premiums.
At the same time, hospital revenues were being dampened by
rising costs, inflation, and reduced occupancy. In an attempt to
rectify these issues, the 1989 Federal Budget established a new
method of Medicare physician reimbursement effective in 1992
using a resource-based relative value scale intended to control cost
increases. This reimbursement formula instituted identical pay-
ments for services, whether they were performed by a generalist
or specialist physician, the intent being to reduce the number of
expensive procedures and lower the incentive for newly minted
physicians to specialize (4).
In the first few years of the new fee schedule, distribution
of payments to physicians of different specialties changed dra-
matically. The average Medicare payments to family physicians
increased by 35% from 1991 to 1997, while payments decreased by
18% for ophthalmologists and by 9% for cardiothoracic surgeons
(9). Despite these favorable shifts for primary care and cognitive
services, many physicians and policy makers questioned whether
the monetary conversion factor provided fair compensation for
physicians’ work.
The most recent strategy from the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) is the Case Managers (CMs) initiative.
This initiative was introduced to help CMS apply a more objective
method of hospital reimbursement based upon the value and vol-
ume of services provided. In doing so, CMs are now required to
work collaboratively with physicians and quality officers in order
to determine which value-adding service should be improved.
CMs are exerting more active roles in the discharge planning of
patients, making the transition of the patient to the next level of
care as smooth as possible, and providing patients with as much
information as possible to help them understand their individ-
ual treatment plans. Successfully doing the above tasks ensures
fewer hospital readmissions resulting higher reimbursement rates.
Medicare will also start tracking spending per beneficiary for the
entire episode of care from 3 days prior to admission to 30 days
post-discharge (10).
Since patients in neurology often are treated for extended peri-
ods of time in medical homes or nursing facilities, it is important to
highlight how later changes in Medicare policies affected the reim-
bursements in these settings. In 1998, Medicare adopted another
PPS for nursing home care in order to curb spending on SNFs.
SNFs are paid a fixed amount per day, with adjustments for health
status and necessary services using Resource Utilization Groups
(RUGs) to place residents into payment categories. In 2000, the
Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) provided increases in
payments for some of these RUGs. One year later, the Bene-
fits Improvements and Protection Act (BIPA) cut some previous
raises and installed more increases to other RUGs (3). All of these
changes affected the quality of care for long stay (Medicaid and
private-pay) nursing home residents (6).
Healthcare epidemiologists have documented the enormous
burden on US hospitals caused by Health-Care-Associated Infec-
tions (HAIs) – the fifth leading cause of death among hospitalized
patients accounting for nearly 100,000 deaths each year in the
US. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 expanded the reporting of
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hospital quality data and required CMS to stop paying hospitals
for the costs associated with managing HAIs if these infections
were not present on admission. Another CMS rule under the 2010
PPACA limits federal payments to states for any additional costs of
care attributable to managing HAIs. With these two rules, hospitals
stand to benefit from providing high quality of care to neurolog-
ical patients to avoid the occurrence of HAIs. Hospitals are still
required to report HAIs though, but they will not be reimbursed
for treatment of them, a feature that will lead to higher standards
of quality care for neurological patients (11).
According to a 2012 survey of members of the American Asso-
ciation of Neuromuscular and Electrodiagnostic (EDX) Medicine
in response to an estimated 31–60% reimbursement cuts to nerve
conduction study codes, 86.5% of respondents said they will be
impacted by the cuts (12). 24.2% of respondents estimated that
their revenue may be reduced by as much as 46–55%, 18.4% esti-
mated a 36–45% reduction, whereas 18% estimated a loss of more
than 56%. More than 70% of respondents expressed concern that
higher-cost studies such as MRI will be used for carpal tunnel or
back surgery, while nearly 50% thought that expensive treatments
such as intravenous immunoglobulin or botulinum toxin would
be initiated inappropriately, and 60% predicted that unnecessary
surgeries would be performed. Regarding training impact, almost
66% of academic respondents indicated the cuts could decrease the
number of residency and fellowship slots in their program. Equip-
ment providers also may feel the impact of the CMS changes, with
96.8% of the survey respondents indicating they think it will be
difficult to justify purchasing new equipment due to the cuts. The
vast majority of respondents (82%) indicated that they will be
looking to improve the efficiencies of their EDX services in light
of the coming changes.
Feared revenue reductions may result in physicians reevaluating
their current practice model. Most respondents (62%) indicated
it is unlikely they will need to close their practice or EDX lab-
oratory (16). However, private practice physicians indicated cuts
could cause consolidation of satellite offices. Additionally, a large
majority of the respondents (83%) indicated they may reduce
the availability of EDX testing appointments. The result could
mean fewer locations and fewer appointments will be available for
patients to receive EDX services. Almost 80% of the respondents
believed that may result in the performance of EDX procedures
moving to large academic practices. About 62% of respondents
stated that their patients will need to travel up to 50 miles for stud-
ies at the nearest academic institution, while 25.1% would need to
travel 50–100 miles for studies. When asked how this cut in reim-
bursement would change their practice with regard to Medicare
patients, more than 63% indicated that it was “very likely” that
they would limit their patients’ access. The potential need to
restrict access was higher for private practice physicians (92%)
when compared to physicians in all other practice types (73%).
Yet, the wave of the future still carries many hopes for the field
of neurology. Many foundations have been set in the past 5 years
that promise great expectations in the years to come. In 2009, the
World Federation of Neurology (WFN) redefined and enlarged its
mission “to foster quality neurology and brain health worldwide.”
The first opportunity to act on a larger scale occurred with the
decision of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to make
non-communicable diseases a priority. Most neurological diseases
fall in this category, and hence, on March 30, 2011, the WFN orga-
nized a meeting in Geneva that invited leaders from all the brain
organizations to work together, and that resulted in the creation
of the World Brain Alliance (WBA) which originally was made
up of 10 organizations. The WBA had an influence on the UN
agenda and sought to begin by working through the World Health
Organization (WHO). Their resolution on non-communicable
diseases was established in September 2011, emphasizing three
major pillars of the WBA; there is no health without brain health,
brain health begins with education, and finally, our brains are our
future. For the first time, the WFN leaders were able to reclassify
stroke from being a cardiovascular disease to being a brain disease.
The effort continues to have dementia classified as a neurological
disorder rather than a mental disorder. The education committee
has become the largest and most highly achieving committee of
the WFN, and it is expected with more networking and fostering
dedicated leadership, that the scope of neurology care will cover
primary, secondary, and tertiary aspects of healthcare all over the
world.
Various countries with DRG-based payment systems have
included adjustment factors into the formula in order to permit for
variations of DRG-tariffs across different provider types, without
changing the underlying pricing logic of the system. In summary,
the design of a DRG system is contingent upon a number of tech-
nical and policy choices to be made as to the DRG variant, the DRG
grouper software, the classification system of diagnoses and proce-
dures, the costing strategy, the types of costs covered, expenditure
or volume ceilings, the level of penalties for fraudulent coding,
and readmission procedures. In addition, country health financing
actors need to clarify who pays for the start-up costs of introduc-
ing a DRG system, such as the training of coders, the information
technology, the implementation phase, as well as for the ongoing
costs such as the regular review of the DRG system, and the addi-
tional administrative procedures of monitoring coding practices
and quality assurance (13).
There are currently 13 countries with a nationwide DRG-based
payment system in place by the end of 2011 including Croa-
tia, Estonia, Hungary, Indonesia, Krygyzstan, Macedonia, Mexico,
Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey [see
(14) for a review].
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As we reflect on the healthcare reforms of the past, we must rec-
ognize that rising healthcare costs are “one of the central fiscal
challenges facing the federal government” (15). The test of time
will tell whether the PPACA will achieve the goal of decreasing
health care spending while ensuring quality universal healthcare
services.
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